On the afternoon of July 26, 1922, aboard the Yongfeng at Bai'etan, Guangzhou.

Chiang Kai-shek wrote down a piece of "confirmed news" in his diary: the Northern Expedition army had taken Shaoguan on the 24th.

He went on: in his heart he still suspected the news was false, but compared with the past few days he was, after all, much happier.

This time, his suspicion was right.

A Shaoguan That Changed Every Day

The men on the ship were waiting for the Northern Expedition army. Sun Yat-sen's plan was for it to turn back from Jiangxi, take Shaoguan, and come south on Guangzhou, so that army and navy could close in from land and water together. That is why, all that month, the word "Shaoguan" appeared in Chiang's diary almost every day, and the conclusion changed almost every day with it.

By his diary: on July 14, with no battle report from the 13th in hand, he inferred that the righteous army must already hold Shaozhou. On the 15th he heard it had been taken on the 12th, and judged, "weighing the circumstances, it is hardly mistaken." On the 17th the news was "now winning, now losing, impossible to pin down." On the 18th every quarter said it had been taken, and he asked himself: is it really so? On the 19th every quarter said Shaoguan was still in enemy hands. On the 20th, "the news today is dull," and he concluded that Shaoguan was still held by the enemy. On the 21st he reckoned that it could have been taken on the 20th.

Each time, he gave himself the same verdict: the final victory will surely be ours.

On the 26th the "confirmed news" came. But by the 30th he was writing again: no news to speak of, unbearably dull, no knowing on what day the punitive army would finally take Shaoguan.

Four days later, his own diary showed that the "confirmed news" had not been confirmed.

The circular that Sun Yat-sen wrote to his comrades in September told what had happened at the other end: the Northern Expedition army began fierce fighting at Shaozhou on July 9, then sent a detachment out by way of Wengyuan, over more than twenty days in all; at first its spirits were high, but the rebels held the Guangdong-Hankou railway, which made moving troops easy, and defended to the death "relying on a strong city"; finally the enemy troops from the Jiangxi side came up behind, the Northern Expedition army was caught front and rear, and fell back to eastern Jiangxi and the Hunan border. The circular nowhere says Shaoguan was taken.

The Yongxiang That Slipped Away, the Guns That Were Only Imagined

The news on shore could not be trusted, and neither could the ships on the water.

On the afternoon of July 14, he heard that the warship Yongxiang meant to sneak away. Nothing could be done, he wrote; they had to let it go, because it lay too close to the Shamian concession, and he feared a diplomatic incident.

Sun Yat-sen's circular confirms that worry from another side: the rebels had meant to shell Shamian, "bringing about an international dispute," and did not succeed.

A week later the Yongxiang, which had been let go, came back into Chiang's diary. On July 22 Sun Yat-sen told him that someone had reported that the rebels were going to use the warships Zhaohe and Yongxiang to attack the fleet. Chiang called it a bluff, "how laughable." Then in one breath he listed the rebels' methods: first seizing ships, then mines, then aircraft, not a day without trying to harm the head of state aboard.

This list appears only in his diary. For the seizing of ships and the aircraft, this article found no other record to check against.

The Pen on Board

Days on the ship were also days of writing. By his diary, the day after the dash past the Chewai forts he drafted a letter for the navy's officers and men and a document on behalf of the president; on the 12th he drafted a manifesto. On the 30th he read the Zuo Zhuan and miscellaneous books, and noted down for himself a rule of war: a general's strength lies in planning, not bravery; troops should be few and good, not many; one must not rely on heavy troops and sluggish troops, but must keep plenty of light troops and nimble troops.

Kill Without Stopping

On August 9, at the very end of that day's diary, he started a new line: my countrymen, my comrades, my descendants, do not forget Chen Jiongming's crime of plotting against the head of state and the party leader. "Kill without stopping."

On the ship to Shanghai, that sentence took another form. By his diary, on the afternoon of August 10 he, Sun Yat-sen and Wang Jingwei discussed the main points of the manifesto to be issued. On the 12th the wind, waves, fog and rain were the worst he had ever met, and he could not get out of bed. On the 13th the ship reached the waters outside Wusongkou, the waves were too high for the launch to come out, and he went over the wording of the manifesto again with Wang Jingwei.

On August 15 Sun Yat-sen issued his manifesto in Shanghai. It said that for the sake of the law of the state, this criminal band of Chen Jiongming's should indeed be put to death, and that all who had blood in their veins should rise together to attack, "cutting out the root, letting it spread no further." Chiang wrote in that day's diary that opinion at home and abroad was praising it.

Whose pen produced the manifesto, the diary does not say; it says only "discussed," and does not say who wrote it.

Two Numbers

From June 29, when he boarded, to August 9, when he left Guangzhou, Chiang spent forty-two days aboard.

Sun Yat-sen's manifesto says "for as long as two months"; his circular says that from June 16 to August 9 was "more than fifty days." The two men were not counting the same stretch: Sun counted from the day of the mutiny, Chiang from the day he himself came aboard.

On March 25, 1925, on the Eastern Expedition, having learned of Sun Yat-sen's death, Chiang wrote one more sentence in his diary: if Chen Jiongming the traitor is not killed, one is no true man of the revolution.

On the afternoon of July 26, 1922, after the "confirmed news," he wrote: "in my heart I still suspect it is false." Of all that month's diary, this was one of the rare times he was not taken in by the news.

Sources and narrative limits

  1. Diary: read from the user-supplied electronic transcription/OCR text of Chiang Kai-shek's diaries, 1917–1936 (a transcription of the manuscript held at the Hoover Institution, Stanford), entries for July 11–August 15, 1922 and March 22–27, 1925. The manuscript images were not examined. The base text has missing characters in several places on July 11, 12 and 14, and the lower half of the July 12 entry is marked in the base text "original illegible"; the article paraphrases only the legible parts. Sentences introduced by "by his diary" rest on the diary alone.
  2. Complete Works of the Founding Father (Guofu quanji): Modern China Press edition of 1989, twelve volumes, read in the e-book in the Sun Yat-sen academic database of the National Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall (accessed October 31, 2026); page numbers are those of that edition. Two pieces are used: Sun Yat-sen, "Manifesto announcing the events of the Guangdong disturbance and stating the aim of unity" (August 15, 1922), vol. 2, pp. 97–99, which the database says is from the original printed single sheet of the "Manifesto of the Constitutional Protection President" held by the Party History Committee (048/15); and "Circular to party comrades on the course of the Chen rebellion and future policy" (September 18, 1922), vol. 2, pp. 103–109, which the database says is from Li Shuixian, History of Chen Jiongming's Treason (Xin Fujian bao edition, November 1922). The circular also appears in Huang Yan, ed., Selected Works of Sun Wen, vol. 2 (Guangdong People's Publishing House, 2006), taken from the Shanghai Shangbao of September 24–26, 1922 under the title "A statement to Kuomintang comrades on the Chen Jiongming mutiny and future plans"; this time that text was compared for wording only, through the version published on the Sun Yat-sen research website, and the printed pages were not checked; the Shaozhou passage quoted here reads the same in both texts.
  3. Confirmation and refutation: (1) The "confirmed news" of July 26: Chiang's own entry for July 30 already says "no knowing on what day the punitive army will take Shaoguan," and Sun's circular says only that the rebels held out behind a strong city and that the Northern Expedition army was caught front and rear and withdrew, without saying Shaoguan was taken; on this basis the article says the "confirmed news" was not confirmed. Sun's circular is an after-the-fact account from Sun's own side, not an independent third-party source; Chen Jiongming's side and the day-to-day battle reports in the newspapers of the time were not seen. (2) The Yongxiang's departure and the Shamian worry: the circular's "again wished to shell Shamian, bringing about an international dispute, and did not succeed" and Chiang's July 14 "fearing a diplomatic matter" point to the same worry, but the circular does not mention the Yongxiang, so the two only agree as side evidence. (3) The July 22 "seizing ships, mines, aircraft": the circular also mentions the mines; the seizing of ships and the aircraft are found in no other source and rest on a single source. (4) "Praised by opinion at home and abroad" is only Chiang's statement; the Chinese and foreign newspapers of the time were not checked.
  4. Claims not used or corrected: the statement that "Wang Jingwei drafted the manifesto aboard the Yongfeng" is not supported by the diary—the entries for August 10 and 13 say only that Chiang, Sun and Wang "discussed the main points of the manifesto" and "discussed the wording of the manifesto," and the place was a merchant ship on the way from Hong Kong to Shanghai, not the Yongfeng; the article does not say who wrote it. The claim of "seasickness" is also absent from the diary: the base text for August 11 and 12 says only that the waves were high and he went to sleep, and that he "could not get out of bed"; the article reproduces this and does not write "seasick." The dash past the Chewai forts on July 10, the mine near the American ship, the "ten times worse" of August 1, the decision to leave Guangdong on August 7, the British warship of August 9, the change of ship at Hong Kong, the landing at Wusong on August 14, the Record of President Sun's Ordeal in Guangzhou and Sun's preface, the appointments of 1923–1924, and the two echoes of 1926 and 1936 have all been told earlier in this series and are not repeated here.
  5. Inference and calculation: "forty-two days" counts June 29 to August 9 inclusive. "Sun counted from the day of the mutiny, Chiang from the day he himself came aboard" is a comparison of the start and end dates each man wrote, an explanation and not the sources' own words. "One of the rare times he was not taken in by the news" is the author's summary, not the sources' words. In the July 11 entry the characters after "on behalf of the president" are missing; what was drafted is unknown, and the article does not supply it.
  6. Not used: recollections by Ma Xiang, Xie Xinzhun, Chen Ce and other people aboard, accounts from Chen Jiongming's side, original newspapers of Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Shanghai for July–August 1922, and telegrams and recollections of Northern Expedition commanders such as Xu Chongzhi and Li Liejun, for none of which a readable original was found this time, so they are not cited; scholarly works were not read in the original and are not cited. There is no second-hand quotation in this article.

Notes (original wording; translations by the editor)

  1. Chiang diary, July 26, 1922: "In the afternoon received confirmed news that our army occupied Shaoguan on the 24th; in my heart I still suspect it is false, yet the gladness is greater than before."
  2. Chiang diary, July 14, 1922: "No battle report from the rebel front on the 13th, hence the righteous army must have occupied Shaozhou." July 15: "Heard that our army occupied Shaozhou on the 12th; weighing the circumstances, it is hardly mistaken." July 17: "Today's news from the front is now winning, now losing, impossible to pin down; at this time all one can do is hold one's own mind as master, and judge that the final victory must belong to the righteous army." July 18: "Today news from all quarters says the righteous army has occupied Shaozhou; I do not know whether it is truly so." July 19: "Today news from all quarters says Shaoguan is still in the rebels' hands... I know the final victory will be held by our army; this can be asserted." July 20: "The news today is dull, so I know Shaoguan is still in the enemy's hands." July 21: "Reckoning by guess, Shaoguan could have been taken by our army on the 20th."
  3. Chiang diary, July 30, 1922: "No news to speak of today, unbearably dull; I do not know on what day the punitive army will finally occupy Shaoguan. A general's strength lies in planning and not in bravery, troops should be good and not many—truly so. In using troops one must not use heavy troops and sluggish troops; the essential thing is to prepare plenty of light troops and nimble troops. Today read the 'Zuo zhuan' and miscellaneous books." (The base text reads "左转"; this should be "左传" Zuo zhuan, an inference.)
  4. Sun Yat-sen, "Circular to party comrades on the course of the Chen rebellion and future policy" (September 18, 1922), Guofu quanji vol. 2, pp. 106–107: "After the guns were fired I returned to Whampoa, to await the return of the Northern Expedition armies to relieve us, so that by land and water together we might wipe out the rebel army." "The divisions of Xu, Li, Zhu and Huang advanced from Nanxiong and Shixing to Shaozhou and on July 9 began fierce fighting with the bandits, and again sent a detachment out by way of Wengyuan... for more than twenty days in all; at first their edge was very keen and they repeatedly broke the bandits' strength... but the bandits held the Guangdong-Hankou railway, with convenient transport, and relying on a strong city put up stubborn resistance... until the troops of Cai Chengxun and Shen Hongying came up behind... whereupon the divisions of Xu, Li, Huang and Chen were caught front and rear and could fight no more. The divisions of Xu, Li and Huang withdrew to eastern Jiangxi, and those of Zhu and Chen to the Hunan border."
  5. Chiang diary, July 14, 1922: "In the afternoon heard that the warship Yongxiang meant to sneak far away; nothing could be done, we had only to let it go, since it lay too close to the Shamian concession and I feared a diplomatic matter."
  6. Sun's circular, Guofu quanji vol. 2, p. 107: "After I led the ships from Whampoa to Bai'etan, the bandits tried to strike the Yongfeng with mines and did not succeed; they also wished to shell Shamian, bringing about an international dispute, and did not succeed."
  7. Chiang diary, July 22, 1922: "Heard the head of state say that [missing] reported the rebel army would use the two warships Zhaohe and Yongxiang to attack our warships. I know the rebels' schemes of intimidation and harm are exhausted, and so they put out this most desperate bluff—how laughable. The rebels first used ship-seizing, then mines, then aircraft; not a day passes without their thinking of harming the head of state aboard the warship."
  8. Chiang diary, July 11, 1922: "In the morning drafted a letter to [missing] Jixin for the navy's officers and men... and then drafted on behalf of the president [missing]." July 12: "In the morning drafted a manifesto on behalf of [missing] army." The base text itself reads "on behalf of [missing] army," the □ being a missing character, so on whose behalf is unknown; the article says only that he "drafted a manifesto."
  9. Chiang diary, August 9, 1922: "My countrymen, my comrades, my descendants, do not forget the crime of the rebel Chen Jiongming in plotting against the head of state and the party leader; kill without stopping."
  10. Chiang diary, August 10, 1922: "In the afternoon discussed the situation; with the head of state and Jixin, the three of us studied the main points of the manifesto." August 12: "Wind, waves, fog and rain very great, such as I have never met before. Could not get out of bed." August 13: "At three arrived outside Wusongkou; because of the high waves the launch could not come out. So could not land; studied the wording of the manifesto with Brother Jixin." (Jixin is Wang Jingwei's courtesy name.)
  11. Sun Yat-sen, "Manifesto announcing the events of the Guangdong disturbance and stating the aim of unity" (August 15, 1922), Guofu quanji vol. 2, pp. 97–99: "I led only a few warships and met the emergency in haste... attacked from all sides, and with forts and mines added they pressed their attack without ceasing... so that, braving danger and hardship, standing alone and holding fast, it lasted as long as two months"; "For the sake of the law of the state, this criminal should indeed be put to death; for the sake of humanity, this pest should indeed be removed. All who have blood in their veins should rise together to attack, cutting out the root and letting it spread no further."
  12. Chiang diary, August 15, 1922: "Today Mr. Sun issued his manifesto, praised and approved by opinion at home and abroad; all day worked and conferred at Sun's residence."
  13. Sun's circular, Guofu quanji vol. 2, p. 107: "From June 16 to August 9, a full fifty-odd days, though the officers and men aboard were extremely worn, their spirit grew only fiercer."
  14. Chiang diary, June 29, 1922: "At two in the afternoon reached Whampoa and boarded the Yongfeng." August 9: "Then settled to leave Guangdong at four in the afternoon on the British warship Moxi." (Used for counting the forty-two days.)
  15. Chiang diary, March 22, 1925: "Received a circular telegram from Governor Hu, and learned that the Premier passed away at half past nine in the morning on the 12th of this month at his residence in the capital. Alas!" March 25: "A reflection: it says, to kill the grass one must first remove the root, to catch the bandits one must catch their chief. If Chen Jiongming the traitor is not killed, one is no true man of the revolution."