Clio Walker | An AI-assisted contemporary historical narrative checked against the Chiang Kai-shek Diaries and independent sources. This is neither Chiang's original prose nor a submission by him. The diary used here is a user-provided electronic compilation and transcription, not a complete original manuscript.

October 20, 1920: "Today I was appointed forward commander of the Guangdong Army's Second Army. I declined and did not accept, and neither Jingcun [Chen Jiongming] nor Ruwei [Xu Chongzhi] dared insist on conferring it. My sincerity is now plainer than before; toward my friends, my heart is consoled." A military post had been set before Chiang Kai-shek: forward commander of the Guangdong Army's Second Army.

He did not take it.

Four days later, at five in the morning, he got up and drafted the Guangdong Army's third-stage operational plan and plan of attack. At eight he sent them to the commander in chief and the army commander.

The post refused, the plans written anyway.

Nine days later, the Guangdong Army fought its way into Guangzhou. A week after that, he was already on a boat home.

I. Seven Thousand Yuan Lost on Shares

That summer he shuttled between Fujian, Shanghai, and his home village.

On July 8 he sailed south, reached Xiamen the next day, and went on to Zhangzhou. On the 18th, back on Gulangyu, a telegram came from Chen Guofu: shares had crashed, and he had lost more than seven thousand yuan. He blamed Chen and the others, and days later was still fretting over the business.

On the 19th he decided the Guangdong Army would get nowhere and thought of going to Russia. On the 28th he saw Liao Zhongkai and, out of friendship with Xu Chongzhi, decided not to return to Shanghai for now.

Sun Yat-sen wanted the Guangdong Army to fight its way back from Fujian into Guangdong and seize ground to stand on. But the army was in Chen Jiongming's hands. It had long been settled around Zhangzhou; marching southwest meant leaving familiar ground to collide head-on with the Guangxi clique that controlled Guangdong.

Chiang stood on this line, and could command no one.

II. Persuaded Once, Half Agreeing

On August 7 he returned to Shanghai and went with Liao Zhongkai to see Sun Yat-sen. Soon the Guangdong Army entered Guangdong, taking Meixian and Shantou in late August.

He did not go with it.

On the 31st, Dai Jitao urged him to go to Guangdong. He refused. When Liao urged him again, he feared that too much stubbornness would hurt a friendship, and gave a conditional yes.

That afternoon he went to the stock exchange, found it crowded and noisy, and felt he was not cut out to be a broker.

The front and the exchange put questions to him on the same day.

On September 15 another letter came from Zhang Jingjiang, pressing him. Just as life had begun to feel a little settled, he was to be drawn in again, and he was gloomy. The next day a letter from Liao pressed him too. He left Tiantong Temple and took a boat to Ningbo.

On September 22 Sun Yat-sen offered him three roads, Russia, Sichuan, or Guangdong, and told him to choose.

He weighed them: Guangdong would help the cause and cost him personally; Sichuan was where he wanted to go; for Russia, his companions would not be close friends, so not for now. Liao still argued for Guangdong.

That evening he went to see Zhang Jingjiang about a partnership in which he planned to invest fifteen thousand yuan.

III. Passing Through Hong Kong

In the end he boarded the boat south. Before leaving on September 30 he called on Hu Hanmin to discuss what would come after Guangzhou was taken. On board he talked further with Wang Jingwei, Liao Zhongkai, and others.

On October 1 he set himself a rule: "Only bear responsibility; do not contend for power or advantage." On this trip he would help as a friend and comrade, and accept no post.

On October 3 the boat reached Hong Kong. He went to mourn Zhu Zhixin and wept bitterly.

When he had arrived in Xiamen in July, Zhu Zhixin had been among those who came to meet him. This time, going south, what met him was a friend's coffin.

On the 5th he reached Shantou and drafted a telegram of operational views for Chen Jiongming. At noon on the 11th he reached Laolong, a transport hub on the upper East River, now part of Longchuan in Guangdong, and entered the general headquarters.

IV. Inside Guangzhou, Everyone Had a Plan

By now Guangzhou was already coming loose.

On September 26, Li Fulin and Wei Bangping openly turned against Military Governor Mo Rongxin and demanded that he leave. Li controlled the Canton–Samshui railway and blocked Guangxi reinforcements; the river defense force also went over to the anti-Mo side. Wei held the Guangzhou police, and Li's headquarters were at Honam, on the south bank of the Pearl River.

Mo was still military governor, but the railway, the police, and the river defense no longer all obeyed him.

On the 27th, the military government's foreign minister, Wen Zongyao, and finance minister, Chen Jintao, went to U.S. Consul General Bergholz and asked him to mediate. Bergholz said he could step in only if both sides wanted it.

On the 30th, Li, Wei, and Chen Jiongming's representative went to the French consul general instead, saying they had chosen Tang Tingguang to replace Mo and asking the consular body to pass the word on. The consuls unanimously refused: announcing a military governor on behalf of opponents of the existing government was not their business.

The foreigners feared fighting in the city would harm their nationals and interests, yet they could not even agree on words of caution. Bergholz proposed asking the French consul general to tell Chen Jiongming and the others that the consular body was deeply concerned about an assault on the city and street fighting. France, Portugal, and Japan agreed; the British consul general, having left the meeting early, objected.

In early October, Tang Tingguang took office as military governor at Honam, while Mo still refused to resign. One city, two governors. As late as October 10, Bergholz judged in a telegram that Mo's strength was growing and that fighting had actually become less likely.

Battle reports from Huizhou and Shilong soon made that judgment obsolete.

V. A Birthday at Field Headquarters

On October 14, Xu Chongzhi came to ask Chiang for help. He left Laolong to take charge of the Second Army's affairs.

On the 20th the appointment came, and he declined it. Then he wrote the operational plan.

The 26th was his birthday by the old calendar. At the field headquarters in the Xiangshui military temple he thought of home, and complained that the organization was incomplete, the staff not up to the work, acting in charge was hard going.

The man who would not accept a post still had to carry the load for an incomplete organization.

VI. Guangzhou Changes Hands

The Guangdong Army kept pushing west. Huizhou fell, and Shilong was under pressure. Cen Chunxuan telegraphed his resignation as chairman of the military government's administrative council, proposing that the southwest end its independence and return to Beijing. On October 27 Mo Rongxin announced the end of Guangdong's independence, saying he would withdraw from Guangzhou and leave order in the city to Tang Tingguang.

On the 28th a meeting had been arranged to settle the terms of Mo's withdrawal. His representative did not come. On inquiry, it turned out Mo had already gone.

Guangxi troops fell back one after another toward the North River and home to Guangxi. That night, Guangxi soldiers still holding the arsenal set off explosions and fires, badly damaging the works. On the 29th there was scattered fighting at the Canton–Hankow railway station in Guangzhou and in front of the civil governor's office; some Guangxi troops surrendered, and several thousand of Chen Jiongming's men entered the city. Stray bullets from the station fell into the Shamian concession; fortunately nothing serious came of it.

Before leaving office, Yang Yongtai handed the civil governor's seal to Wei Bangping. Wei apparently did not want to act, so Tang Tingguang took on both military and civil governorships.

U.S. Vice Consul Adams said a major battle near Guangzhou was now less likely; whether Guangdong's factions could divide the offices amicably was hard to say.

The battle won, the seals were still changing hands.

VII. Sun Yat-sen's Letter

On October 29, Sun Yat-sen wrote to Chiang.

Chen Jiongming, the letter said, had given his all in returning to Guangdong, and Sun hoped others would help him just as fully. He likened his trust in Chen to his trust in Huang Xing and Chen Qimei in earlier years. He wanted agreement in principle and policy, but said he was no autocrat, content merely that no one dared oppose him.

He also mentioned Zhu Zhixin's sudden death, the loss of a capable helper.

Of Chiang, the letter said: brave, honest, knows soldiering. It also faulted him: a hard temper, too much disgust for the ways of the world, often difficult to get along with. To shoulder the party's responsibilities, he should make some accommodation.

Sun asked him to convey this trust in Chen Jiongming to Chen, and hoped that Chiang would take on the work himself.

VIII. Leaving Again

At five in the afternoon on November 5, Chiang took the train and reached Guangzhou at seven, where he saw Xu Chongzhi and Deng Keng.

He was full of grievances. Early the next morning he decided to go back to Shanghai; by afternoon he was in Hong Kong.

On the 7th he was still asking himself why he had quarreled with colleagues over trifles, and felt army life did not suit him. On the 9th he boarded a ship; on the 12th he switched to a small steam launch at Wusong to enter Shanghai, and then went home to Fenghua.

At home he saw that Weiguo could already read characters and was delighted; a few days later he was still playing with the boy.

The urgent telegrams caught up with him again. On the 21st, Sun Yat-sen, with Zhang Jingjiang and Dai Jitao, wired him to come to Shanghai, saying that if he did not go, Xu Chongzhi would not move either. He was torn: family matters unfinished, and going would do no good. He declined.

This time he did not pack again.

IX. The Man Writing Proposals from Afar

Guangzhou's new order was built up bit by bit. On November 1 Chen Jiongming declared invalid Cen's and Mo's dissolution of the military government and cancellation of independence. Liao Zhongkai took charge of finances on the 5th. On the 10th Chen took office as civil governor of Guangdong and commander in chief of the Guangdong Army.

On November 25, at home, Chiang noted that Sun Yat-sen, with Tang Shaoyi, Wu Tingfang, and others, had left Shanghai for Guangdong. Three days later they reached Guangzhou. Foreign reports in early December described the city as quiet and business as slack.

On December 1, at home, he began drafting yet another set of proposals for the military government.

The post refused, the plans written anyway. From October to December he was the same: finding answers for the army, yet refusing to sit down inside it.

He had gone home, and the telegrams still followed him. On January 11, 1921, Sun Yat-sen wired: "Please come and help, brother... no more delay; reply at once."

———

Sources, editions, and boundaries

  1. Principal diary source: the user-authorized Google Drive electronic transcription named 蒋介石日记 1917-1936年 （手稿本） [斯坦福大学藏].txt, file ID 1MZwKz2FNghiF-PlrLsl3DPgNl3BBb677. The filename's reference to a manuscript does not establish that manuscript images were obtained. Relevant July–December 1920 context was actually read, including July 8, 9, 18, 19, and 28; August 7 and 31; September 15, 16, 22, and 30; October 1, 3, 5, 11, 14, 15, 20, 24, and 26; November 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 17, 21, and 25; and December 1. These entries were compared with the user's Library DOCX and private R1 entries. Gaps, omissions, the traditional-calendar birthday, and Chiang's attribution of blame remain identifiable. The private source is not supplied as a public appendix or retrieval service.
  2. Independent source group A: Sun Yat-sen, 致蔣中正信託陳炯明回粵事函, dated October 29, 1920, formally transcribed in the Sun Yat-sen academic database. The record identifies Collected Works, volume 5, page 270, and its source as a letter included in Mao Sicheng's 1937 compilation. The posted text was actually read; neither the original letter nor the 1937 printed book was inspected. The published text begins with an omission, so it is not represented as an unabridged original. https://sunology.culture.tw/detail/23e54c068e03258217c0ef628b03237e/?seq=2 . Sun generated a separate authorial source, but its later transmission through a Chiang-related compilation is explicitly acknowledged.
  3. Independent source group B, outside Chiang's political circle: U.S. Department of State, FRUS 1920, volume I, documents 472, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, and 480. Actually read were reports or telegrams by Bergholz, Adams, and Price dated September 28 (893.00/3586), October 5 (893.00/3589), October 10, received October 12 (893.00/3537), October 30 (893.00/3638), November 6 (893.00/3645), November 13 (893.00/3666), and December 1 (893.00/3690). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1920v01/d472 ; https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1920v01/d474 ; https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1920v01/d475 ; https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1920v01/d476 ; https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1920v01/d477 ; https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1920v01/d478 ; https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1920v01/d480 . These are officially published English texts. The diplomatic system counts as one source group, not as multiple independent groups merely because several documents exist. Predictions and assessments remain those of their observers.
  4. Supplementary check: Guangzhou local-history office, 援闽粤军回师广州, September 2, 2020, https://www.gzsqw.org.cn/c/sdfzpc/gmfy/4044.jhtml . Its statements about transfer of seals and assumption of office require distinction; this narrative does not construct a single definitive ceremony date from them. Contemporary reports distinguish expectations from accession. The later overview supports background and is not counted as a further contemporary source group.
  5. Geography: Laolong corresponds to present-day Laolong, Longchuan County, Heyuan, as described by the Heyuan local-history office in 东江名镇：老隆（上）: https://web.archive.org/web/20260823135518/http://www.heyuan.gov.cn/bmjy/hysdfzbgs/tzgg/content/post_267452.html . Guangzhou's historical Honam refers to the area south of the Pearl River, not Henan Province. Xiangshui military temple remains the transcription's place designation; its precise historical site is unresolved and is not identified with a modern namesake. Shanghai, Shantou, Hong Kong, and Guangzhou receive only event-supported city-level identification, without invented hotel, station, or letter-reading coordinates.
  6. Rights and narration: the diary is quoted only in the eight-character Chinese phrase 惟负责任，不争权利; otherwise necessary contents are paraphrased in original prose. Its private full text is not published. Sun's letter is used through limited original paraphrase; neither the entire letter nor modern website notes are reproduced. FRUS publishes U.S. government historical documents. Dialogue, weather, lighting, and private thoughts have not been invented. Chiang's motives and judgments of others are presented only within their recorded scope. The later Sun–Chen rupture is not treated as already inevitable in 1920.
  1. Specific limits: the date on Sun’s letter does not establish when or where Chiang read it. Missing characters around the October 1 entry are not silently supplied. October 26 is the traditional-calendar birthday identified in the diary, not a Gregorian anniversary inferred here. Chiang’s financial accusations do not determine other people’s responsibility, and his operational plans do not establish credit for the whole campaign. Chen’s formal accession follows the November 10 date in FRUS document 478, distinguished from the expectations in document 477 and the November 5 transfer of seals mentioned in the later local-history account.